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ABSTRACT 
Following Singapore (1975), some metropolitan areas introduced pricing schemes to make car users aware 
of the real costs of their trip. This research looks at citizens’ reactions to the hypothetical introduction of a 
road pricing scheme in Lyon (France). 
People’s perceptions were investigated through a sample of 61 persons selected according to a stratified 
sampling plan. A web-questionnaire was administered to the participants, and eight focus groups were 
then organized, each including about 7-8 persons. The focus groups allowed us to investigate the 
participants’ opinions, emotions, and reactions to the hypothetical introduction of different road pricing 
schemes in the urban area. 
This research has largely confirmed what found in previous studies and its key additional contribution is the 
clustering of citizens according to their reactions. Different groups of people showed dissimilar attitudes 
and opinions about the effect of road pricing, but the whole sample agreed upon the need for a coherent 
policy both for transport planning and management in the Lyon metropolitan area, while respecting 
freedom of mobility. In fact, citizens expect that a reduction of their freedom to move by car should be 
compensated with a strong and clear policy to improve the alternative modes and want to know clearly 
how revenues will be spent. A clear communication policy should be defined and this should be tailored 
according to the different groups defined in this paper. 
 
Keywords: road pricing; traffic congestion; air pollution; pricing policies; transport; city; urban transport 
policy; parking policy; mobility; focus group; citizens' opinions; citizens' emotions; travel behaviour  
1. Introduction 
Road pricing schemes have long been used as policy instruments to tackle traffic congestion and 
environmental pollution in urban areas or to finance infrastructures (Lindberg, 1995). Vickrey (1963) and 
Button (1995) have recognised the effectiveness of pricing schemes in managing congestion, if set up with 
real prices, not just “notional charges”, to induce behavioural changes.  
The earliest and best known example is Singapore, where road pricing was implemented in 1975, and 
nowadays there are some interesting experiments underway all over the world. In Europe, the most 
important cases are those of London, Stockholm, Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Milano, and, since January 
2013, Gothenburg. Furthermore, Austria and Germany introduced (respectively in 2004 and 2005) a 
distance-based road pricing scheme applied just to trucks.  
These applications can give some insights about the perception and the effectiveness of such schemes. 
Concerning the cases of Hong Kong and Seoul, Harrington et al. (2001) report a traffic decrease by nearly 
14% in the tunnels where charging is applied while carpools, buses and taxis more than doubled. Similar 
positive effects are reported by Viegas (2001) for Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim. 
Despite the expected positive effects on traffic, lack of public and political acceptance is a serious issue as 
discussed in Jones (1992) and Schlag and Teubel (1997). In fact, public opposition has prevented the spread 
of pricing to other facilities in Hong Kong and Seoul. Public opinion, associations and local stakeholders 
always stress the intrinsic social iniquity of pricing schemes (Langmyhr, 1997; Eliasson and Mattsson, 2006), 
which inevitably emphasizes people disparities, since benefits would be greater for the wealthiest. Sheldon 
et al. (1993) point out that the lack of acceptance stems from the misperception of the negative effects as 
being caused by others rather than by oneself. Viegas (2001) states that the management of road pricing 
schemes should be based on efficiency and equity as basic economic objectives. 
Thus, road pricing policies still encounters strong oppositions and remain very unpopular; the low public 
acceptability is one of the strongest barriers hindering their applicability (Langmyhr, 1997). As highlighted 
by Jakobsson et al. (2000), people feel a lack of freedom by having to pay for something that has been 
always free of charge. 
As a result decision makers - although willing to introduce a road pricing policy - often abandon the idea, 
also considering the huge investment required to establish a management system. Moreover, some 
administrators are not very confident of the expected traffic results and fear political consequences 
(Viegas, 2001). 
Nevertheless, decision makers who had the courage to keep to their views are satisfied with the results, 
and citizens as well recognize the benefits and generally approve the pricing schemes. That is the case of 
Stockholm, where a first trial pricing scheme was introduced in January 2006. The results were satisfactory, 
even beyond the most optimistic expectations, and when in September 2006 the citizens had to express 
their willingness to keep the scheme or not (referendum), a narrow majority decided for a permanent 
charge, although the pre-test opinion polls highlighted a majority against the congestion charging (Jansson, 
2008). The Stockholm experience shows that such a measure, usually unpopular, can be appreciated and 
supported as long as valid alternatives to car use are provided. Similarly, UK adults increased their support 
for road pricing from 30% to 57% if the revenues were spent on a mix of improved transit, local traffic 
management and better pedestrian facilities (Harrington  et al., 2001).  
Since 1990, in Norway money is raised to finance improvements in road and public transport thanks to the 
toll rings (Odecka and Brathenb, 2002; Larsen, 1995; Lauridsen, 2011). Positive outcomes are also evident 
on congestion levels, since traffic growth is slower than the national average, while the public transport 
share increases and two thirds of the citizens are favourable to a new toll ring if the revenues subsidize 
public transport. In Stockholm, road pricing produced an increase of 6% in public transport use. In 2007 
London enlarged the charging zone previously established in 2003 and incoming traffic decreased by 16% 
while congestion fell by 30% (May et al., 2010). 
Beside low public and political acceptance, claims of social injustice and iniquity, another feared 
consequence of road pricing schemes is the loss of attractiveness of the city centre, entailing negative 
effects on its commercial and social role within the conurbation. Even though businesses always fear huge 
decreases of their sales and productivity, empirical evidences show that such worries are not justified. A 
decline in Trondheim annual turnover registered before the introduction of the toll was reversed after the 
implementation of the cordon charge, demonstrating that the toll was not influent on business trends. 
Similarly, in London business surveys show a broadly neutral impact of the congestion charge on central 
London economy (May et al., 2010). 
However, the real effect of pricing schemes and their acceptance can be certainly known only after their 
implementation, since they strongly depend on the characteristics of the town and on the citizens’ modal 
choice (Santos and Rojey, 2004). Furthermore, the gap between perception and behaviour is an important 
point in forecasting the effects of pricing schemes and remains an element of uncertainty for decision 
makers. De Groot and Steg (2006) tried to analyse through an internet survey how a transport pricing policy 
may reduce car use. The results showed that people ignore how they would behave if a pricing scheme 
were actually implemented, and they find it difficult to imagine its behavioural consequences. This 
highlights how the mere quantitative approach is inadequate to explore in depth such a tricky issue, 
involving principles of social equity and individuals’ freedom. 
This paper investigates citizens' reactions to the hypothetical introduction of a road pricing scheme in Lyon 
(France), tackling both traffic congestion and air pollution. A sample of 61 residents in the Lyon 
metropolitan area participated to a discussion (managed through focus groups) on different transport 
policies, particularly focussed on road pricing policy. They also filled in a quantitative web questionnaire, 
thus allowing us to investigate the same issues through a mixed approach, using both qualitative and 
quantitative investigation methods. This paper focuses on the qualitative analysis, presenting only the 
results of the focus group discussions. 
The next sections explain the methodology for the survey and the data analysis design. The results are then 
described and conclusions are finally presented. 
2. Methodology: the survey and the data analysis 
Figure 1 shows the Lyon Metropolitan Area, under the Grand Lyon authority, which covers 512 km² (58 
municipalities) and houses about 1.3 million people. Lyon is an important centre of economic development 
and it is the 2nd French metropolitan area after Paris. The orography of the territory (partially hilly and 
crossed by two rivers, Rhone and Saone) makes road traffic often congested, notably during peak hours, in 
the city, in the tunnels and on the ring-road TEO (“Trans Est-Ouest”, the Boulevard Périphérique Nord de 
Lyon). 
Participants to the survey were selected according to a stratified convenience sampling plan based on 
gender; age; education; occupation; income; presence of children in the household; travel pattern (travel 
time, scope, used mode, origin and destination). A sample size of 61 people allowed us to manage a 
feasible number of focus groups (about 7-8 people in each one of eight Focus Groups). The sample was not 
designed  to represent the Lyon or French population, but to include different users’ profiles so as to better 
test all possible reactions. 
The web-questionnaire, created with the software LimeSurvey, was addressed to the participants in two 
stages: a first part a few days before the Focus Group (focusing on travel behaviour, attitudes, life style, 
urban transport policies, and socio-economic data), and a second part on the day after the discussion (only 
focusing on road pricing). This set up prevented participants from knowing that the key topic of the 
discussion would be road pricing, thus allowing us to get people's spontaneous reactions. The focus group 
investigated the same issues contained in the questionnaire to allow a cross-reference with the topics 
discussed. 
The survey was held in October 2011 in Lyon, in the premises of the University.  
The focus groups started with a short presentation of the participants (name, occupation, household 
composition, residence and work location) and investigated three main issues:  
1. daily mobility: travel habits (modes most used, trip purposes and durations) and attitudes; 
2. transport policies: at first there was a theoretical discussion about the three levers (technology, 
economics, and individual behaviour) suggested by the European Commission to deal with traffic 
problems. Then, specific transport policies were presented (bike sharing, car pooling, car sharing, High 
Occupancy Lanes, Limited Speed Zones, Limited Traffic Zones, Pedestrian Zones, Charging Zones, 
tackling alternatively car congestion or car pollution), and participants expressed their opinions about 
them; 
3. hypothetical road pricing in Lyon. The proposed scheme would be in force during weekdays from 7.00 
a.m. to 7.00 p.m. and apply to all cars entering or circulating in Lyon (excluding the 5ème and the 9ème 
arrondissements) and in the outer city of Villeurbanne. This third topic was the core of the research and 
several issues were discussed (see Results). 
 
Figure 1 – Grand Lyon area 
The discussions during the focus groups were recorded (audio and video) and verbatim transcribed. The 
transcriptions were then carefully read in order to draw a synoptic grid including main subjects and sub-
subjects, thus creating the structure for the content analysis. Then the participants' wordings on the 
different topics were reported in the grid. This work was carried out iteratively, to organize raw data in a 
definite structure (Krueger and Casey, 2000; Zammuner, 2003). 
3. Results  
The participants were well gender balanced (30 women and 31 men) and rather highly educated: 37.7% 
hold a university degree, and 24,6% have a school-leaving certificate; only 3 persons (4,9%) do not have any 
diploma. 32.8% of interviewees are high level professionals, 23% office-workers, 9.84% students and 
11.48% retired.  
The average gross household income is 3,000-5,000 €/month for 27.9% of participants, while 26.2% earn 
1,500-3,000 €/month; only 10% did not reveal their income. As regards household composition, 37.7% of 
people in the sample live in a couple; 29.5% live alone, and nearly 23% have a large family (4 people 
minimum). People living with kids represent nearly 30% of the sample.  
Considering car ownership and travel habits, almost all respondents have a driving license (95%) and the 
overall car availability is rather high: 42,6% own one car while 37.7% own two cars. However, almost 10% 
do not have any car available within the household.  
Analysing daily travels, the mode most used is the car as driver (57.4%), while nearly 20% use public 
transport. Slow modes are currently used by 13% (5% use the bike while 8.2% walk). Since most of the 
participants are part of the working population, for 72% of them the most frequent trip is the one to work, 
while for the six students in the group the home-university trip is the most frequent one. Car is the most 
frequent transport mode also during the weekend (for 75.4%), while 13.11% use public transport.  
In the Annex, a table offers a synthetic overview of the participants’ socio-economic characteristics and 
travel habits. Furthermore, the table is also a useful reference to understand the profile of the participants 
which are mentioned in the following sections. 
The focus group participants can be roughly divided in two groups based on their first reactions to the 
hypothetic road pricing in Lyon. 
A first group, the largest, showed a strong opposition, rejecting the idea of a congestion charge, which 
would be a very unfair policy, socially unacceptable, emphasizing the differences between rich and poor 
people, also increasing social segregation. Many participants are against the principle and perceive the 
congestion charge like the TEO (ring-road), whose high toll raised strong protests in 1997-98 since it 
highlighted socio-economical differences between "those who have the means and can pay and those who 
cannot and must therefore queue up in the Fourvière tunnel for half an hour" (Virginie). Many participants 
felt that a toll would become just a supplementary tax, a simple way to raise money from the citizens 
during the recession, not an effective measure for reducing congestion and pollution. Another common 
feeling was the sense of fear towards road pricing: several participants admit that the car represents their 
freedom to be proud of, while a pricing scheme would infringe their personal freedom.  
The second group showed a more moderate reaction to the toll hypothesis, not opposing its introduction a 
priori and recognizing the need for effective measures to limit traffic and pollution. Although someone was 
even a supporter of road pricing, the dominant reaction was not "Welcome the toll", but a general 
awareness that road pricing could become a reality, as it happened elsewhere. This group demanded that 
the toll should be defined within a coherent urban transport policy, in order to offer a real alternative to 
the car for all metropolitan trips. The supply of modes other than the car seemed mandatory to the 
greatest part of the interviewees, who argued that "otherwise people will not understand and the toll 
policy would turn out to be not useful" (Sophie R).  
 A deeper analysis of the different reactions allowed refining the first rough division of respondents in two 
groups, defining six homogeneous groups as regards their position towards the introduction of a pricing 
scheme: 4 out of the 61 participants are not included on the groups below because they did not give any 
element useful to label them: 
 a very small group (n=3, 5.3%) representing a “niche” of people showing a positive attitude, 
supporting the introduction of a pricing policy, is labelled “Supporters”; 
 a small group (n=6, 10.5%) expressing a general positive attitude but showing a degree of caution, 
is labelled “Cannily well-disposed”  ; 
 the biggest group (n=18, 31.6%) that deeply debated about such a policy, showing a good 
knowledge and an open mind attitude in understanding the pros and cons, but without taking a 
defined position, is labelled “Non-partisans”. Some of them might be considered as the ones that 
would probably shift towards a more positive position towards the charge, if part of a larger and 
coherent transport policy; 
 a group (n=9, 15.8% ) showing a certain unwillingness towards the pricing, is named “Reluctants”; 
 a large group (n=16, 28.1%) that expressed a great, but polite conviction about the senselessness  
of such a policy, is named “Strong opponents”; 
 a small group (n=5, 8.8%) that showed a very negative and rude attitude expressed with a certain 
degree of postural and verbal violence, is labelled as “Fierce opponents”. 
Table 2 shows the socio-economic characteristics of each group, as well as their travel habits. It is 
interesting to compare the groups as regards their age, household income, presence of children in the 
household and of, course, their travel habits (mainly the modal choice and the time spent for the most 
frequent trip). Other variables are less significant in characterizing them.  
Table 2 - Socio-economical characteristics and travel habits of the identified groups 
  
Supporters 
(n=3) 
Cannily Well-
disposed (n=6) 
Non partisans 
(n=18) 
Reluctants 
(n=9) 
Strong 
opponents 
(n=16) 
Fierce 
opponents 
(n=5) 
Gender 
Female 66.6% 33.3% 66.6% 22.2% 43.7% 40% 
Male 33.3% 66.6% 33.3% 77.8% 56.3% 60% 
Age 
[years old] 
Average 35.33 49.33 38.83 48.55 45.8 41.2 
Median 32 53 31 52 43 39 
Education 
Low - - 11.2% 22.2% 18.7% - 
Medium 66.6% 66.6% 44.4% 11.2% 43.7% 60% 
High 33.3% 33.3% 44.4% 66.6% 37.6% 40% 
Occupation 
Student 33.3% (PhD) - 27.5% - - - 
Worker - - 5.5% - - - 
Office-worker 33.3% - 39.5% 22.2% 43.7% 80% 
High level 33.3% 83.3% 16.5% 66.6% 37.6% 20% 
Retired - 16.7% 11% 11.2% 18.7% - 
HH income 
[€/month] 
Average 1833 3708.3 2703.1 3937.5 3583.3 2950 
Median 2250 4000 2250 4000 4000 2250 
HH 
composition 
Single 33.3% 33.3% 39.3% 11.2% 18.7% 40% 
Couple 66.6% 16.7% 16.5% 33.3% 56.3% 20% 
3 people hh - - 16.5% - - 40% 
>= 4 people hh - 50% 22.2% 44.3% 18.7% - 
Single with a 
child 
- - - 11.2% 6.3% - 
ND - - 5.5% - - - 
HH with 
children 
 - 50% 22.2% 55.5% 25% 40% 
Used mode 
Car - 33.3% 55.8% 66.7% 75% 100% 
Motorbike - 16.7% - - - - 
Regional Train - - - 11.1% - - 
PT - 50% 22.2% - 12.4% - 
Bike 33.3% - - - - - 
Foot 33.3% - 5.5% - - - 
Other 
(specified) 
33.3% Only on 
foot (SS) / PT 
(AW) 
- 
5.5% Bike (SS) 
/ PT (AW) 
5.5% Bike (SS) 
/ Only on foot 
(AW) 
5.5%  Only on 
foot (SS) / PT 
(AW) 
11.1% Car + PT 
+ On foot 
11.1% Two-
wheelers (SS) / 
Car (AW) 
6.3% PT + foot 
6.3% Car + PT + 
foot 
- 
Scope 
Work 33.3% 83.3% 61.2% 88.9% 75% 100% 
Voluntary work - - - 11.1% 12.4% - 
Study 33.3% - 22.2% - - - 
Shopping 33.3% - - - - - 
Leisure - 16.7% 11.1% - 6.3% - 
Pick up / Drop 
someone 
- - 5.5% - 6.3% - 
Most frequent 
OD 
IN 66.6% 33.3% 50% - 31.3% 40% 
MIX 33.3% 33.3% 27.8% 77.8% 56.3% 60% 
EXT - 33.3% 22.2% 22.2% 12.4% - 
Time spent 
[min] 
Average 17.33 22 23.3 44.44 31.38 43 
Median 15 22.5 20 45 30 30 
 
The "Supporters" get the lowest salary (1833 €/month as an average), are one of the youngest group 
(average age 35, median 32), they have no kids and they all use environmentally friendly modes (bike, foot 
and PT), spending the lowest time to travel. This, probably, explains their more favourable attitude towards 
the pricing, because they would not be really touched by such a policy. The “Cannily well-disposed” are well 
balanced between motorised modes (50%) and PT (50%), they are the oldest group (average age 49, 
median 53) earning the second highest salary (3708 €/month) and 50% of them live with their kids. Their 
socio-economic characteristics are similar those of  the "Reluctants' ", who are the richest (3937 €/month) 
and the second oldest group (average age 48.5, median 52). Moreover, 56% of them live with their kids. 
Although their socio-economic characteristics are very similar, they have different travel habits, since the 
“Reluctants” are more car dependent (only 11.1% use PT) and their travel time is definitely the highest 
among all groups (both the average and the median are of about 45 minutes). This aspect leads them to be 
more reluctant towards the introduction of a road pricing policy. Nevertheless, both "Cannily well-
disposed" and "Reluctants" take a moderate stance, although on opposite sides. In between them, the 
"Non-partisans" are a very interesting group, one of the youngest (average age 39, median 31), living in 
households with a medium-low salary (2703 €/month). Their modal choice is rather well balanced between 
car (56%) and sustainable modes (44%). The two groups of opponents are mainly or totally  composed by 
car users: 75% of the "Strong opponents" and 100% of the "Fierce opponents" are motorists. The Strong 
opponents are the third oldest (average age 46, median 43) and richest group (3583 €/month), while the 
Fierce opponents are a bit younger (average age 41, median 39) and have a medium salary (2950 €/month). 
Besides the 57 classified participants, 4 could not be included in the groups because they did not give any 
element useful to label them. 
In the next paragraphs the results will be presented analysing both the single groups and cutting across 
them to find out the divergences as well as the potential commonalities. The main focus will be on the 
acceptable and deterrent charge levels  to understand the potential effect of the introduction of a pricing 
scheme in Lyon, critically comparing them with the effects already recorded in other cities. 
3.1  The charge level and the size of the congestion zone 
The charge level that participants would consider rather acceptable varies a lot, according to personal 
revenues, attitudes and needs.  
When asked to define the charge level that would be a real deterrent for them, many participants 
spontaneously made a comparison with the parking rate in the city centre and the cost of a public transport 
ticket. Someone defined the threshold for the rate equal to the single ticket price (1.60 €), while others at 
least to the return ticket (3.2 €), otherwise the car would still appear to be less expensive. Those opinions 
cut across the “Non-partisans”, the “Reluctants” and the opponents who were sometimes more critical or 
analysed more deeply the value of the charge. 
The levels declared by each participant are shown in table 3, where people are grouped according to their 
overall position towards the hypothesized policy. Some specific comments on charge level for each of the 
participants (although not exhaustive) are reported, putting a coloured flag next to the comments recurring 
in different groups; finally, the commonalities within a group are given in the last column to facilitate the 
characterization of each group.  
Observing the values in Table 3, the Fierce opponents towards the charge assigned a very low deterrent 
value, equal to 0.5 €, which goes up a bit for the strong opponents  to 3 € with a case of 5 €. Few 
exceptional cases stated a quite high “symbolic” threshold declaring to be willing to pay “an unlimited toll” 
or “anything”. The reason is that they really need to travel by car and they could not get to work without it, 
so they would bear such a constraint and pay, unless it is worthier to change job.  
The “non-partisans” present a wider range of values, going from 1 to 8 € with an exception for Cyril who 
pointed out as deterrent threshold the fine for parking in a no-parking zone, corresponding to 17 €. The 
groups more favourable to a charge present higher and more homogeneous values, from 3 to 7.5 €, 
stressing more the importance to define high values to deter the use of car but offering, in the meantime, 
real alternatives to the users (public transport ¬ PT and park and ride ¬ P+R). 
Table 3 - Groups, acceptable and deterrent charge levels, comments and commonalities 
 
The acceptable level of the charge is, instead, more homogeneous throughout the groups, going from 1.5 
to 2 € with an exception till to 3.5 € for the “Cannily well-disposed” and several “0” € for the “Reluctants” 
and the Opponents. 
A reason supporting the acceptance of a hypothetical toll is that the car represents a symbol of freedom, as 
Cyril highlighted, and that people would probably accept to pay in order to preserve their freedom to 
move.  
In synthesis, it is interesting to observe that 15 out of 48 people have not considered acceptable any 
charge. Excluding the above 15 people, the distribution of the charges ranges from 0.5 to 5 €. The median 
of the value is 1.5 €, where the most cited charges are 1.5 (9 persons) and 2 € (12 persons). The deterrent 
tariff ranges from 0.5 to 17 € with the median at 5 € and a flat distribution (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 – Level of acceptable and deterrent charges 
The people not accepting any charge belong to all groups except the two most positive ones. Table 4 
reports the average and median value of the acceptable and deterrent charges according to the six groups 
of opinions towards the road pricing. It can be noticed that the participants who expressed a violently 
negative attitude towards road pricing show the lowest values and that they do not consider any rate 
acceptable. People favourable or rather positive towards such a measure show the highest values of the 
charges and identify quite high daily values for ensuring a deterrent effect for car users. An interesting and 
numerous group is that of people who have extensively debated during the discussion, highlighting the 
pros and cons of the measure and showing in some cases a good attitude to accept the road pricing if 
introduced. This is clearly emerged from their discussion, showing well informed people who are able to 
consider the multifaceted aspects of this transport policy, being also able to appreciate the positive effects 
while being aware that it should be properly used to be accepted. 
Table 4 – Average and median values expressed by the groups for acceptable and deterrent charges 
 
Some ideas spontaneously emerged during the discussions: 
 the employers would probably pay half of the charge, as for the parking; 
 the rate could be varied according to the number of car passengers, although this would entail the 
management of different charge levels; 
 the pros and cons of a very low rate, accessible for the great majority of people, and of a rate high 
enough to effectively discourage car use; 
 the application of a tax during the days with pollution peaks, to be paid several instalments spread 
throughout the year. This would allow the tax to be better supported, but also perceived as a lower 
burden and then less discouraging of car use. 
The “Cannily well-disposed”, the Non-partisans” and the “Reluctants” called for a coherent urban transport 
policy based on two pillars: increasing park and ride facilities and improving public transport services. 
Considering the first pillar, many participants stressed that the cost of parking already plays a significant 
role in limiting their access to the city centre by car: they prefer using public transport or walking. Thus, a 
well-planned parking policy, supported by adequate park and ride facilities, would allow an easier 
management of congestion and make car access less attractive, avoiding the introduction of road pricing. 
Nevertheless, some people remarked that the public administration could not support building free parking 
lots at the entrance of the city since this would not bring any financial advantage.  
The improvement in public transport supply, constituting the second pillar, was strongly recommended by 
all participants, since it would offer a real alternative to car use. Some participants highlighted that current 
(year 2011)public transport fares are too high (single ticket: 1.60 €; pass: 52€/month), especially for 
occasional riders; in addition, many of them wanted free public transport, even more strongly if a pricing 
scheme were introduced. Virginie suggested having free public transport at least in periods of pollution 
peaks, so as to effectively induce people to leave the car at home. By the way, someone stressed that "free 
public transport" would not be actually free, since its cost would be supported somehow (e.g. by income 
taxes). They highlighted the main role of the “versement transport”, a tax paid by the enterprises, both 
public and private, to fund the construction and maintenance of transport systems. 
Modulating the toll according to the cars' pollutant emissions (the less polluting cars pay a reduced rate) 
was proposed by several groups (except the “Fierce opponents”) (Table 2) even though the way of doing it 
divided the participants. Many people opposed, sometimes very strongly, considering it doubly unfair, since 
it would favour rich people and penalize those who have an old car and cannot afford a new one, who 
should then give up travelling by car or bear an excessive rate. Usually having newer and less pollutant cars 
(Mélissa), wealthier people would pay less and also "take advantage from greater traffic fluidity" (Franck), 
or "could also buy a hybrid car to pay a reduced rate" (Régis), or simply bear the cost of a higher rate 
without any problem. Furthermore, some participants thought that such a proposal would not be the best 
method to make people aware and responsible against pollution. On the other hand, someone agreed with 
paying according to car emissions even if owning an old car. Cyril was particularly enthusiastic about 
Ecopass, the congestion charge in force in the centre of Milano, where the rate varies according to the car 
pollutant emissions. Pierre as well would appreciate an Ecopass Lyon, since such a policy "would allow fleet 
renewal, economic upturn, pension investments and increase of jobs".  
Rémy proposed to "tax the purchase of polluting cars", while Michael G. put forward defining the toll by 
"making the ratio between the year of the car and also [the level of] pollution". Yves suggested considering 
both the power and the pollutant emissions level. 
The definition of “polluting car” was extensively debated since both old small cars and big, new gas-guzzlers 
are polluting; thus also car size and vehicle capacity should be considered in the definition of the proper 
rate. In fact, those who buy big and high-powered cars are usually richer and could then afford to pay a 
higher charge. Interestingly, Gaëlle highlighted that the solution to modulate the toll based on the car 
power does not necessarily penalize all "rich people" since "there are people who will buy a small car to use 
it just in the city to avoid paying a high charge".  
The reactions to a change of rate level according to the income level or the car characteristics varied a lot. 
Those opposing the idea argued that the rate should be the same for everyone: "because everyone should 
have the same right to move" (Malika), otherwise "also the baguette should have different prices according 
to the income level", as well as all other products. Michael W. highlighted that "since the tax does not have 
the role of redistributing money, it would not make sense to impose different charge levels". Moreover, a 
few people felt scared about data confidentiality and traceability. On the other hand, those in favour of a 
variable charge think it would be "fairer" (Sophie P) and "more logical" (Régis), as it gives the opportunity to 
everyone "to contribute according to his/her possibility, as for other taxes" (Marie-Chantal).  
Despite the interesting proposals of modulating the rate for a fairer toll, several participants highlighted 
that the toll management system should then be more elaborated, requiring more resources and would 
thus jeopardize its economical convenience.  
Another important issue concerns the residents, who cannot escape the charging zone. Some participants 
argued it would be normal, even “mandatory” (Julien), for residents to have a reduction. Deborah 
envisaged a 90% reduction, as in London, or even a free pass "since people living in the city centre already 
pay the yearly parking subscription" (Françoise). Conversely, someone pointed out that a 90% reduction 
would be excessive, and the objective of deterring car use would be missed. Furthermore, in such a 
scenario, "the residents would be the only ones taking advantage of the charge effects, since their 
environment would be calmer and quieter, at other people's expense" (Régis). Sophie R. proposed that 
residents could have 2-3 free accesses per day, as in Montpellier. 
When discussing the size of the charging zone, several people highlighted that the hypothetical area (the 
municipality of Lyon, excluding the 5th and the 9th arrondissement, and the outer city of Villeurbanne, see 
Figure 2) would definitely be too large, huge, and unreasonable. An argument supporting this opinion is 
that such a size "will increase the traffic jams in surrounding areas which are already rather congested".  
Moreover, the inclusion in the charging zone of some quiet areas (the 8th arrondissement, part of the 3rd, 
and, particularly, Villeurbanne) really seemed just a way to raise money. Others pointed out that the Croix 
Rousse (4th) should not be included, since its hilly topography makes it not convenient for soft modes. 
On the other hand, someone remarked that it would be fairer to include even the 5th and 9th, or, at least, 
the 9th where there are many professional activities. 
 
Figure 3 – Lyon neighbourhoods (from 1st to 9th) and Villeurbanne, in the North-East 
Table 5 presents a synthesis of the opinions, classified by groups. It can be observed how there is a quite 
common view about limiting the wideness of the pricing area, excluding the calm districts. The “Non-
partisans” are again those debating more the issue, stating that it is not given for granted that the charge 
will be really useful to deter the use of the car, but it would be interesting to test the charge in the 
Presqu'Ile in order to figure out how it could work for the whole city. 
Table 5 – Opinions on the size of the charged area 
 
The idea of limiting the charging zone to the Presqu'Ile (2nd) seemed to be much more reasonable, also 
supported by the particular geography (narrow area between the two rivers).  
This solution can be "rather acceptable from a social point of view, as the ones who do not want to pay can 
do everything on foot or by public transport, which is highly concentrated here". 
Nevertheless, attention must be paid to the management of traffic along the banks of the rivers (Rhône and 
Saône), to prevent them from becoming parking areas; this was their status before the recent 
requalification. Moreover, the administration should be careful towards the whole city and not just to the 
centre, to avoid an increase of traffic in the outer area just to preserve the most touristic sites. Finally, 
Michael G. highlighted that the toll in the Presqu’Ile could trigger a vicious circle, "leading the city centre 
car parks to bankruptcy".  
Those more favourable to the charge think that closing the Presqu’Ile would be valuable for the city 
because this scheme would leave more space to pedestrians, reducing car congestion and noise, and make 
it more attractive for tourists. The opponents argue that it would be fairer to extend the charge over all 
Lyon and the Fierce opponents think that closing the centre would change the shopping habits and it would 
be unfair for families with babies and elderly people. 
3.2  Opinions about the pricing and hypothetical behaviours 
Table 6 reports a summary of the opinions, classified per group. It can be noticed how the different groups 
are focused on different aspects even though there are some topics showing some agreement amongst the 
participants. The traffic pollution is effectively perceived both by those favourable to the pricing and by the 
Reluctants, while health effects of the traffic pollution are more felt by the most favourable and by the 
“non-partisans”.  
The urban sprawl potentially caused by the charge worries the “Cannily well-disposed”, the “Non-partisans” 
and the “Reluctants”. Such sprawl is often evoked as undesirable, since it would both entail environmental 
concerns and determine a strong economical and cultural recession of the city and of its role within the 
agglomeration. Big malls in the outskirts already become more and more attractive, particularly for 
motorists, since “using the car in the city centre sucks” (Régis). If a congestion charge were to become 
reality, the commerce in the Presqu'Ile would be further impaired. Colette imagined strong protests from 
traders, while Jacques and François would see the death of the city and of the Presqu'Ile. Several 
participants recognized they would change their shopping habits, "strongly penalizing the businesses in the 
city centre" (Eric). 
The “Non-partisans” are those who think more about the potential effects of the charge, hypothesising 
users’ behaviour and comparing with the London pricing. Instead, who is favourable depicts potential 
scenarios affecting the city centre and the parking along the rivers and propose how to formulate the 
charge. The participants against the pricing policy do not believe in its effectiveness and emphasise only 
negative aspects and effects, saying that in any case, due to the urban sprawl, they can accede to any 
service by car, outside the pricing area.  
Table 6 - Opinions about the charge 
 
Other people would not care about the toll, since they rarely come to the city centre which they do not like, 
preferring the countryside and the outskirts, where every place can be reached by car. The importance of 
the car is evoked both by “Non-partisans” and “Reluctants” who emphasize the freedom it allows.  
The effectiveness of the toll in reducing congestion and pollution divided the participants. The participants 
favourable to the pricing are well aware about the urban congestion and its impact and believe it is 
important to take some remedies, while the “Non-partisans” observe that the congestion is everywhere, 
also in the outer district. Instead the opponents state that the problem is to get into the city and not inside 
the city and that the pricing could generate an over-congestion in the areas outside the charging zone, 
because “crazy traffic jams” would mainly move to the border of the tolled zone. Many others recalled that 
people continue to travel by car despite the fuel price increases; also people continue to smoke even 
though the price of cigarettes increases, since the role of habit is very strong. Some others thought that the 
toll would be effective in reducing car trips in the city because "it will induce people to think twice before 
taking their car" (Gabriel). Ariane believes that the toll could act as deterrent by making explicit the cost of 
the car, which, although being high, is not really perceived by motorists. 
The daily period of the scheme, 07.00-19.00, could penalize all workers during typical «office hours», while 
paying a charge could be more reasonable for leisure activities. In order to avoid a discrimination for 
workers, Aurélien proposed a 24 hours toll, in force also on Saturday, when people usually have more time 
and can take public transport. Conversely someone tried to suggest « ad hoc mitigations » as a toll only 
during short time periods (e.g. 10.00-16.00) in order to move freely during commuting hours. 
All the participants, except the “supporters”, proposed interventions to make the pricing more acceptable, 
stressing the need to increase the park and ride facilities as well as the provision of feasible alternatives to 
the car. Notably an improvement of PT, to be made before introducing the pricing, is considered of the 
utmost importance and, for the opponents, it should be free to soften the dramatic effect of the charge. 
A transparent knowledge about how the revenues are used could heavily change the citizens’ opinion. A 
redistributive role for an effective return to the community would be highly appreciated, such as 
investments to improve the Vélo’v service and cycle paths, or the public transport supply. Mentioning the 
example of some other municipalities, several participants even expect that the public transport service 
should become free if a toll were actually introduced, since the revenues should finance it. 
The opponents proposed alternative measures to the pricing, considering that it implies high installation 
costs and it is better invest in PT and park and ride, while a  certain number of “Non-partisans” think that it 
is better to invest public money by providing incentives to buy new (green) cars. 
Hypothetical behaviours after the scheme implementation emerged. In table 7 a synthesis of the people 
behaviours is depicted according to the different groups, showing again how the attitude towards such a 
policy strongly characterises the responses. Who is against think that people would do anything to avoid 
paying, relocating or avoiding to go the charging zone; however, they will never renounce to using the car 
and, if obliged to go to the pricing zone, they will pay. Quite transversal to several groups is the awareness 
that people will become used to the new tax and that, however, would try to get around to avoid to pay, 
when possible. 
Table 7 – Hypothetical behaviours in case of a charge 
 These prefigured behaviours turn out to be in line with the behavioural adjustments analysed by Karlström 
and Franklin (2009) during the trial test of the Stockholm congestion charge. Karlström and Franklin 
particularly focused on mode choice and on departure time choice of morning commutes. 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
During the discussion participants to the focus groups "changed their mind" about congestion problems in 
Lyon. At the very beginning, many of them complained about traffic jams and consequent delays, while as 
soon as the hypothetical introduction of a congestion charge in Lyon was mentioned, several participants 
did an about-face, stating that the city congestion level would not justify the introduction of a toll. As 
regards environmental pollution, some people recognized Lyon to be a highly polluted city, but not as 
polluted as China or other Countries which do not apply strict regulations on pollution. Furthermore, many 
participants envisaged that the purposes of tackling congestion and air pollution are "just an excuse to 
squeeze extra money from the citizens", since there would be other effective measures to deal with such 
problems, especially air pollution. Some participants actually took a "defensive attitude", to deny any 
rationale for the introduction of the charge. Nevertheless, a few of them enjoyed the idea of an "Ecopass 
Lyon" encouraging the renewal of the vehicle fleet, although at the expenses of private citizens, as stressed 
by many others. To this extent, public subsidies are required as a concrete help to those who want to buy a 
"greener" car, especially the hybrids. 
Also concerning the charge level, participants' views evolved during the discussion, demonstrating that the 
interaction between the participants is a concrete opportunity to compare their own opinions and to 
possibly change mind. 
Several participants, who firstly placed their threshold at a very low level (e.g. 0.5€ or 1€), soon realized 
along the discussions that a 2 € charge would not be a real deterrent. So they recognized that "although at 
the beginning people would strongly complain, after a while we would all get used to it" and "as long as we 
can pay the toll we would not change our habits” (Rémy), in order to continue taking advantage of car 
comfort. Virginie as well points out that, after a first opposition, all new fees become habits for all those 
who can afford to pay them. The key role of habit is very clear to some of them, particularly to the most 
careful observers. As a concrete example, Yves mentioned the "TEO" (ring-road) that is now so much used 
that is always congested. 
Trip purpose is a very discriminating aspect: the willingness to pay is higher for trips to work and could be 
null for leisure trips to the city. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate those who need to use the car daily and 
those who use it just exceptionally, Mélissa proposes a daily fee of 7-9 € (a significant disincentive for those 
who come occasionally) and a monthly fee of 30 € for those who must use the car daily for work-related 
reasons.  
As expected, most car users were strong opponents, and few of them were also rather impolite while 
aggressively replying that they would not pay anything. Furthermore, car users identified direct and precise 
figures, while people who rarely use the car had more difficulties in figuring out a possible rate. Some 
identified a very high rate, which would be a real deterrent to car use. Others identified a very low rate, 
since not being interested in travelling by car in the city, they would not pay for it. 
Road pricing acceptance usually increases consistently after its implementation since habit plays a 
significant role. Larsen (1995), in his overview of toll cordons in Norway, testifies that the share of 
opponents to the toll before its introduction in Bergen was far greater (54%) than the share recorded one 
year later (36.5%), while the share of people supporting the toll increased from 13% to 50%. This recalls the 
Graduality Strategy, elaborated by Noam Chomsky (Herman and Chomsky, 2002), stating that to make a 
measure acceptable, it has to be applied gradually, little by little, for years. This is the way in which new 
socio-economical conditions (neoliberism) were imposed in the eighties and nineties: little welfare, 
privatizations, precariousness, flexibility, unemployment, low wages. So many changes that would have 
caused a revolution if applied all at once. 
Despite overall public acceptability of road pricing is usually very low, it increases when information and 
explanations on its role and importance to tackle traffic congestion and environmental problems are given 
(Musselwhite and Lyons, 2009). It is crucial to clarify the reason why a road pricing should be introduced 
(Bielefeldt, 2004; Bird and Vigor, 2006; Vägverket, 2002), in order to prevent that the toll is perceived like 
an unmotivated imposition, or just as a mean to raise money from the citizens.  
A key factor contributing to road pricing acceptability is of course its inclusion in a comprehensive, well 
structured and coherent transport policy (Green and Stone, 2004), offering concrete alternatives to car use 
and including adequate measures for all urban transport modes, as highly requested by all participants 
involved in this study. They also drove the attention on the high installation cost of a toll system - 
confirmed by literature too (Jansson, 2008) - claiming that "the game is not worth the candle", while 
important investments to improve the whole urban transport supply would be much more appreciated. 
Those would include an increase of park and ride areas (which should be accessible 24/24) and the 
improvement of the public transport service (frequency, comfort, safety, etc.). Restrictions should be 
mandatorily coupled with new opportunities (e.g. bonus to buy a "greener" car), otherwise the social 
injustice would be too high and the gap between rich and poor people would further increase. Adequate 
traffic and parking regulations together with subsidies to public transport are effectively considered one of 
the "second-best remedies" to tackle urban traffic congestion and environmental pollution (Jansson, 2008). 
The principle of "freedom" is widely evoked, related both to the "freedom of movement" - which should 
not be threatened by "a fashionable tax during recession periods" - and to the risk of confidential data 
traceability. This last point is especially raised when discussing about the possibility of varying the charge 
level according to the household income, but also when discussing about the risk of being "tracked" by the 
cameras controlling car access to the charging zone. 
This research has largely confirmed what found in previous studies and, as an additional contribution, it has 
allowed clustering the citizens according to their reactions. We were able to characterize 6 different groups 
which we labelled in relation to their reaction to road pricing. The Supporters are rather young, earn a low 
salary, and only use environmentally friendly modes. This, probably, explains their more favourable attitude 
towards the pricing, because they would not be really touched by such a policy. The Cannily well-disposed, 
the oldest group, have a positive attitude towards modes that are alternative to the car and the habit to 
use them facilitates the acceptance of the policy envisaged. The Non-partisans are very open-minded and 
able to identify the pros and cons of the hypothetical road pricing. The participants who disagree were 
divided in three groups, according to the strength of their reaction. The Reluctants showed a moderately 
negative position, the Strong opponents were firmly convinced of the uselessness of the proposed policy, 
and the Fierce opponents were even violent and impolite, almost refusing to even discuss the hypothesized 
policy. 
It can be noticed that the groups have different attitudes and opinions about the effect of road charging, 
but there are some common points on which the policy makers should concentrate because they could 
facilitate the acceptance of the road pricing. Citizens expect that a reduction of their freedom to move by 
car should be compensated with a strong and clear policy to improve the alternative modes and want to 
know clearly how the revenues will be spent. A clear communication policy should be defined and this 
should be tailored according to the different groups defined in this paper. 
Beside the opinions and ideas presented throughout the discussions, the debates suggested some 
interesting considerations from the methodological point of view. The discussions' dynamics confirmed 
how the Focus Group investigation method invites people both to think individually and to react to other 
participants’ remarks, while the traditional quantitative investigation method (questionnaire) does not 
offer any opportunity of discussion among respondents. Moreover, participants were usually rather 
talkative and proactive: only five out of the 61 (8.2%) did not sufficiently intervene on the different topics. 
Nevertheless, when questionnaire respondents are "forced" to reply to all questions (very easy to do with 
an online questionnaire), there is no certainty about their care, honesty and awareness (Rappazzo, 2010). 
Due to the Social Desirability Bias (Nederhof, 1985; Kreuter et al., 2008; King and Bruner, 2000; Fisher and 
Katz, 2000), people may give answers that do not correspond to their real opinions but which are more 
convenient and socially appreciated. Conversely, it would be difficult for Focus Group participants to "play a 
role" throughout the whole discussion, so they usually have spontaneous and genuine reactions, as 
confirmed during the current study by strong opponents to road pricing. Qualitative methods allow us 
monitoring citizens’ emotions, reactions and changes of opinions when issues are analyzed from multiple 
points of view. Furthermore, such methods allows to get quantitative results, as showed in this paper, 
highlighting the importance of using alternative methods when pricing issues are investigated. 
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